Introduction
The OK-FIRST Program was developed, beginning in October 1996, as a formal educational outreach program of the Oklahoma Climatological Survey. The goal of OK-FIRST was to develop a transportable, agency-driven information-support system that helped public safety agencies harness the information age. The desired impact of OK-FIRST was documentable improvements in how public safety agencies (fire, police, and emergency management) responded to weather emergencies.
Today, over three years later, more than 100 public safety agencies ( Figure 1 ) -in support of their respective missions -have received formal training in how to access and use many new forms of environmental information via OK-FIRST and a spin-off program known as ONALERT (e.g., data from the Oklahoma Mesonetwork, volumescan data from 15 WSR-88Ds, and other data from the modernized National Weather Service [NWS] ). By design, most communities served by OK-FIRST represented rural areas of Oklahoma (e.g., ~50% have populations of 5,000 or less). As a result of having been "modernized" by OK-FIRST, public-safety agencies across Oklahoma have achieved numerous success stories from the application of OK-FIRST data.
The most revealing testimonials about the effectiveness and robustness of OK-FIRST occurred on 3 May 1999 -a day of unparalleled killer tornadoes that impacted central and northern Oklahoma (Figure 2 ). Because the meteorological community of Oklahoma (including the NWS and the broadcast media) performed superbly in dealing with the well-over 50 tornadoes, the death and injury toll was amazingly limited to 44 fatalities and 700+ injuries. This tornado outbreak was responsible for damage to or destruction of nearly 10,000 houses and buildings across the state. The impact of the storms on several rural towns was immense. The town of Mulhall lost most of its buildings including its churches, school, and post office. In a matter of minutes, one tornado eliminated over 50% of the tax revenue for the town of Stroud by destroying the town's three major employers -who decided not to rebuild their facilities. However, as major media outlets properly focused on the widespread death and destruction across heavily-populated central Oklahoma, the OK-FIRST system passed a major, critical test. For example, OK-FIRST servers shared over 36,000 files of WSR-88D information with public-safety users on 3 May. In addition, many significant, lifesaving success stories from rural Oklahoma -which did not make the national headlines -provided convincing evidence that OK-FIRST played an important role in saving the lives of many Oklahomans on 3 May 1999. The purpose of this manuscript is to share some of these "untold stories".
Historical Context
During the recent past, Oklahomans have contended with lengthy droughts, severe flooding, bouts of damaging thunderstorms, and significant tornado outbreaks. Even in "more normal" periods, "non-severe" weather regularly affects human activities such as outdoor entertainment events. In addition, responses to wildfires, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism are impacted by environmental conditions. Before OK-FIRST, Oklahoma was a microcosm of the entire country in how agencies responded to emergencies in that local decision-support systems generally suffered from a nearcomplete lack of current and relevant environmental information. With OK-FIRST, Oklahomans have made great strides in local responses to weather-impacted emergencies; this manuscript documents some of this progress.
Over the past thirty years, much evidence has accumulated to suggest that the National Weather Service (NWS) was disconnected from outside agencies due to outmoded dissemination policies. Access to NWS information by local officials nationwide was cumbersome, expensive, non-intuitive, and lacked critical details. In addition, the NWS occasionally did not receive critical storm or flood reports and thus could not produce appropriate warnings. Morris et al. [13] documented thirty years of this evidence, including:
• In a U.S. Weather Bureau report entitled "The National Research Effort on Improved Weather Description and Prediction for Social and Economic Purposes" (1964), a select panel concluded that "informed decisions on the part of users of weather information are needed if such information is to be translated into beneficial actions." The panel also found that research in improving the link between meteorological service and the users of weather information was markedly deficient. The report stated that several major user groups received little or no attention from the meteorological community [22] .
• In 1970, another panel determined the situation reported in 1964 had not appreciably changed, and that the recommendations were more valid and urgent than ever [14] .
• After the Johnstown, PA, flash flood of 19-20 July 1977 which killed 76 persons, a Natural Disaster Survey Report stated that "neither the National Weather Service component of the Flash Flood Warning System nor that part of it involving local communities and Civil Defense did much good for anyone in the Johnstown, Pennsylvania, area." [16] .
• While the Wichita Falls and Oklahoma City NWS offices provided "excellent warning services" during the 10 April 1979 tornado outbreak, over 40 people perished in Wichita Falls. Many of the deaths resulted from people who were caught in automobiles. In the Kansas City flash flood of 12-13 September 1977, seventeen deaths were car-related. Even today, weather conditions are rarely transmitted automatically to automobiles although technological advances permit. After the Wichita Falls tornado, it was revealed that the ability of the broadcast media to relay critical weather information was hampered by rate increases to the NOAA Weather Wire Service [17, 18] .
• A National Research Council report stated that "for many years, the National Weather Service ... operated on the assumption that if they produced a good product, someone would come to get it and use it. ... Users are currently left largely to their own devices in determining what is available and how to use it; many are unaware of the information available." [15] .
• In June of 1990, a localized area of rain with amounts between 3 and 4 inches occurred in a 45 minute period upstream of Shadyside, Ohio. This flood caused 26 fatalities and the destruction of 80 residences. The NWS issued a flash flood watch for the affected county, but no flash flood warning was issued because the NWS received no information indicating that a flood was imminent. The NWS did not receive real-time flood information from local officials; they did not find out about the flood until four hours after the peak of the flood. In addition, the flash flood watch only reached Shadyside officials through the broadcast media. County officials received notification of the flash flood watch but did not relay this information to local officials in Shadyside [19] .
• While local NWS offices issued tornado warnings with adequate lead time, 42 lives (20 at one church) were lost during the 27 March 1994 Palm Sunday Tornado Outbreak. Though warnings were disseminated using NOAA Weather Radio, local officials and citizens at risk did not receive notification because of the "limited resources many rural county emergency managers and law enforcement officials had at their disposal for receiving the emergency messages and enacting their response plans" [20] .
The $4.5 billion modernization of the NWS during 1990s exacerbated this datatelecommunications problem by producing vast amounts of high-quality, county-scale information with no viable delivery mechanism to those ultimately responsible for making life-and-death decisions. In addition, rural areas -traditionally under served by telecommunications and technology -were at especially high risk. Consequently, local officials made weather-impacted decisions without adequate information (e.g., storm spotters were deployed precariously because coordinators lacked information about storm location, movement, and intensity).
One major component of the NWS modernization was the deployment of an advanced, nationwide Doppler radar network, known as NEXRAD, or WSR-88D. Local officials around the country expected to reap many of the benefits of the NEXRAD system because the network employed computer algorithms to automatically detect significant weather phenomena including rotational signatures, hail, and excessive rainfall. At the same time, the NWS out-sourced the exclusive dissemination of NEXRAD data among four private weather data vendors who provided the data to all entities outside the NWS. Known as NIDS (NEXRAD Information Dissemination Service [1, 6] ), this arrangement was based upon management and logistical problems inherent in the radar-data distribution system used by the NWS during the pre-NEXRAD era; it was based upon federal policy of the 1980s which encouraged the privatization of government information services. Each of the NIDS vendors licensed the data from the NWS and constructed a variety of dissemination mechanisms which ranged from dial-up access to satellite delivery. The vendors also maintained dedicated dial-up connections to each of 154 radars, provided various levels of customer service, and created "value-added" products like regional mosaics. As a result, market forces and the cost of doing business made access to NEXRAD data prohibitively expensive for most public-safety and other government users nationwide. Yet, in Oklahoma, as a result of OK-FIRST, rural users statewide have routinely accessed the NIDS data stream through a publicprivate partnership with one of the NIDS vendors -this situation is a NIDS success story [4] .
Meanwhile, the NWS was working to improve its infrastructure to take advantage of modern computer workstations. Despite these improvements which dramatically improved forecasting and warning capabilities and produced tremendous data resources within the federal government, many of the associated benefits were beyond the financial reach of local public safety officials. Time after time during the past 15-20 years, the NWS made correct decisions involving the issuance of severe weather warnings based upon timely and modern information. Yet, because adequate dissemination systems designed for local officials did not exist, decisions affecting the protection of citizens frequently were made without the benefit of critical and local information.
History of OK-FIRST
The OK-FIRST "information support system", introduced by Crawford et al. [3] , was intended to fill a recognized "service void" in Oklahoma's weather-warning system by building information bridges between the modernized NWS and the unmet, but critical need for information in rural areas during emergencies. It was built upon successes in implementing the Oklahoma Mesonetwork [2] and its K-12 educational outreach program known as EARTHSTORM [9] .
Critical design decisions included evolving OK-FIRST into a "web-based" decision support system [10] built around Internet browsers, plug-in software [24, 25] , and extensive feedback from front-line users [12] . Yet, mere access to modern weather information was not the total solution to the data void problem for public safety users; OK-FIRST staff have supported these users through regular instructional workshops which maintain or improve data interpretation and software skills. Morris and Duvall [11] provided a subjective evaluation while James et al. [5] provided and objective and independent evaluation of impact that OK-FIRST was beginning to have. In addition, the crowning evaluation-achievement to date has been the finalist-status accorded to OK-FIRST by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Ford Foundation [13] . Their "Innovations in American Government" program placed OK-FIRST in the top 25 of 1,609 innovative programs reviewed during 1999.
Testimonials from 3 May 1999
As a result of using the OK-FIRST system, many rural public-safety officials have become proactive rather than reactive when dealing with weather-impacted situations. Stellar examples of this new approach to their duties were revealed through life-saving actions which resulted from decisions made during the killer tornado outbreak of 3 May 1999 -significant stories that did not receive widespread media attention. For example,
• Steve Chapman, Emergency Management Director for the town of Chickasha (location "1" in Figure 2 ), used pinpointed information from his OK-FIRST displays (resulting from combined NWS and NEXRAD information; Figure 3 ) to discern the municipal airport was threatened by one of the first tornadoes of the day. Accordingly, he evacuated the Chickasha airport -a full fifteen minutes before the tornado struck. No fatalities or injuries resulted.
• Later that evening, when another tornado demolished an outlet shopping mall in Stroud (location "2" in Figure 2 ; Figure 4 ), all stores had been vacated. Ben Springfield, Lincoln County Emergency Management Director, was provided frequent radar updates from OK-FIRST, and notified Stroud 30 minutes in advance.
• People in their homes in rural areas also were more secure thanks to the actions of emergency managers that day. After the storms had spun their path of destruction across the Oklahoma City area, they continued northeast. Residents in rural areas received minimal attention from the media, as local news focused much of their coverage upon the devastation and recovery operations in and near Oklahoma City. One of Springfield's assistants, who was monitoring the OK-FIRST radar displays, relayed updates every five minutes on radio frequencies received by scanner. Potential victims received the information and took shelter. Springfield later said that many of these people would otherwise not have taken shelter had it not been for the trustworthy information coming across their scanner. • In Kingfisher County ( Figure 5 ), the town of Dover (location "3" in Figure 2 ) was hit hard, with two-thirds of the houses either destroyed or damaged. Danny Mastalka, Director of Kingfisher County Emergency Management, caused emergency vehicles (including those belonging to police, sheriff, and game warden officials) to traverse the streets to warn the town's citizens 10 to 20 minutes in advance of the storm. The lone fatality in Dover was an individual who chose not to take immediate action after receiving the warning.
• Rescue workers themselves were targets of the storms. A tornado completely destroyed the small community of Mulhall in Logan County (location "4" in Figure 2 ). Rescue workers set up a command center to manage the recovery operations. John Lewis, Logan County Emergency Manager, saw successive tornadoes following similar paths on his OK-FIRST system ( Figure 6 ). He alerted the command center to move their operations -twice. As a result, the rescue workers did not themselves become victims of the storms. In his letter of 10 May 1999, Lewis stated:
"When police and rescue crews arrived at the first Logan County damage site near the City of Crescent, one of the first tasks was to open the highway sufficiently to get an ambulance through from Crescent to the hospital in Guthrie. All efforts were to get that ambulance moving with a critically injured tornado victim. About the time they succeeded, a second tornado approached in the dark. The ambulance and the tornado moved on intersecting paths. Emergency management, aware of both events, was able to stop the ambulance until the tornado passed just in front of it." residents until they were each hit by debris: one by power lines down across his car, the second by a large tree upon his unit. Both officers were uninjured -and so were all but one Mulhall town resident!"
Practically every structure in Mulhall, a community of 945 citizens, was destroyed, including the town's only water tower which had stood since the 1920s.
• In Seminole County, Emergency Management Director Herb Gunter radioed a warning to a caravan of emergency vehicles responding to the Oklahoma City area. Gunter noticed that another tornado was developing ( Figure 7) and would cross an interstate highway ahead of them. The law enforcement convoy closed the highway (location "5" in Figure 2 ) so that neither they nor other vehicles would drive into the storm. • In Garfield County (location "6" in Figure 1 ), seven chase teams monitored four supercell storms, including one that damaged a farm. Perhaps more importantly, other rescue teams from Garfield County traveled to the Oklahoma City area to assist with the aftermath of the storm there. Mike Honigsberg, Director of Garfield County Emergency Management, provided periodic updates of OK-FIRST information to successfully and safely maneuver these rescue teams around the intervening Dover and Mulhall storms.
• The damage that resulted from the hazardous weather on 3 May 1999 was not limited to the counties surrounding Oklahoma City (Figure 8 ). In far northeast Oklahoma, as attention remained focused on the central Oklahoma tornadoes, heavy thunderstorms with flood-producing rains brought 5-6 inches to Ottawa and surrounding counties on the night of May 3rd ( Figure 9 ). Terry Durborow, Figure 8 . Counties in Oklahoma declared disaster areas by President Clinton and the Federal Emergency Management Agency for the severe weather that occurred on 3-4 May 1999. The declarations were made because the amount of damage in these counties was beyond the ability of local governments to respond and provide help to individuals or to repair public infrastructure (i.e., public assistance). Emergency Management Director of the City of Miami, used OK-FIRST to "help protect the public in a timely manner."
Thus, it would seem that OK-FIRST played an important role in saving the lives of many Oklahomans on the night of 3 May 1999. In addition, because first-responders themselves were also in grave danger, the use of OK-FIRST prevented even greater tragedies from occurring.
Summary
As a result of operational successes on 3 May 1999 and during many other situations, OK-FIRST has become a catalyst for change in many local governments. Local officials are now empowered to close bridges during floods, save property in wildfires, improve evacuations after hazardous spills, and protect audiences at outdoor events. Other benefits include more efficient scheduling of public-works projects and information for police and fire investigations. An independent evaluator concluded [5] that OK-FIRST changed the behavior of its graduates and their approach to decisionmaking -for the better.
Because OK-FIRST is widely used and has high recommendations from its users, the National Weather Service -following the May 3rd event -recommended national replication of a technology like OK-FIRST. Congress also authorized a national prototype to be built from OK-FIRST; it is known in Oklahoma as "ONALERT" [7, 8] .
